Só temos, então, a felicitar-nos com a publicação das duas obras em quadrinhos aqui comentadas, na medida em que de novo disponibilizam ao público jovem uma porta de acesso ao milenar imaginário grego. Também pesa nesta apreciação positiva, como vimos, o cuidado dos autores de buscarem um diálogo inovador, mas respeitoso e não-ingênuo, com os clássicos.

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**Derrida and deconstruction**
In 1967 (nearly half a century ago!) Derrida published three books (*La voix et le phénomène. Introduction au problème du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl*, *De la grammaïologie* and *L’écriture et la différence* (translated as *Speech and Phenomena and Other Writings on Husserl’s Theory of Signs*, 1973, *Of Grammatology*, 1976 and *Writing and Difference*, 1978 and 1980) that focused on the nature of the sign and language, on the privileged place of the voice and the spoken word, and on interpretation and meaning in the human sciences in general. This triple exploration of new horizons, published on the eve of the Parisian May revolution, explored the principles of a philosophy of radical ‘presence’ and ‘phonocentrism’, two major items that, for the next decades, were bound to reappear under numerous faces and aspects and were about to change the nature of Western philosophy tout court. A number of what soon would become favourite topics of his were announced here, like the structuralist tenets of De Saussure and Lévi-Strauss (esp. the opposition parole / langue), the status of the theory of literature, the consequences of the rationalism of Descartes, and the importance of Levinas (esp. his opposition between Greek and Jewish). These introductory books were to be followed in 1972 by three new ones, *Positions*, *La dissémination* and *Marges de la Philosophie* (*Positions*, 1981; *Dissemination*, 1981 and 2004; *Margins of Philosophy*, 1982 and 1984), in which he continued his discussion about the written word (esp. the notion of pharmakon in Plato’s Phaedrus) and introduced an analysis of time in Heidegger (with references

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to Aristotle). Included were also an anthropological essay on the ‘end of the mankind’ (read ‘traditional humanism’) and a discussion of the place of the metaphor in philosophical texts (in an paper called ‘White Mythology’).

This small introduction informs us that from the very start, Derrida focused on problems that were situated halfway philosophy and literature and dealt with the philosophy of literature, or, vice versa, with literary (and textual) aspects of philosophy. Or, to put it even in a wider perspective, his main point of interest was on the often unconscious and typical Western ways of reading texts and interpreting their contents. In this broad sense, his activities were very close to the daily practices of all (classical) philologists and literary critics: making sense of texts, their traditions and filiations, the cultural and institutional contexts of their functioning, and the construction (rather the constructedness) of the strategies they work with. From the very start, it was obvious that Derrida did not want to propose a methodology of his own. What he called ‘deconstruction’ was not a discipline nor a procedure that could be taught or copied, and Derrida himself always defined it a contrario, or negatively. In his opinion, ‘deconstruction’ had nothing to do with destruction, nor with immoralism or nihilism. It was not a specific technique nor an analysis, not a hermeneutics nor a criticism, not an archaeology nor a quest for lost origins, not a formalism nor a phenomenology,.....

What was it like then? The late sixties were an era that throve upon the success of structuralism (De Saussure in linguistics, Lévi-Strauss in anthropology) and one of the first points of Derrida’s attack was directed against the notion of structure itself, especially the operations that lead to its constitution and the ideological consequences it had on the philosophical ‘market’. Deconstruction mainly was a process that engaged him to (re) read texts and to ask epistemological questions in the margin of other texts, not resulting into new interpretations but in analytical remarks about their composition. Deconstruction often exposed mechanisms of defence and conquest, at work both in the composition of the text and in the minds of their readers. In line with his discussion of the Apocalypse of John (in D’un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie, 1983) where the operations of mystifying and demystifying were a central issue, part of his deconstructive activities was the uncovering of mostly hidden rhetorical and strategic operations that turn a text into a real text(um). Therefore he focused